CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY
FULLERTON
MIHAYLO COLLEGE
OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS

Department of Economics
Working Paper Series

2019/003

State History and State Fragility: Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

Oasis Kodila-Tedika and Sherif Khalifa

September 2019

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, FULLERTON
Mihaylo College of Business and Economics, *Department of Economics*
800 N. State College Blvd., Fullerton, CA 92834-6848 / T 657-278-2228 / F 657-278-3097

State History and State Fragility

Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa*

Oasis Kodila-Tedika† Sherif Khalifa‡

University of Kinshasa California State University, Fullerton

August 31, 2019

Abstract

This paper examines the association between the length of experience with statehood, or state history, on the likelihood of state fragility. The argument is that the accumulation of knowledge by state personnel, and the build up of experience within state institutions, allows the state to avoid the exposure to recurrent crises, which is considered a symptom of weakness. The paper focuses on sub-Saharan African countries and uses Probit estimation techniques. The analysis shows that state history has a negative and statistically significant effect on the state fragility index. This result is robust after the inclusion of a variety of economic, political, institutional and historical variables. We also use extreme fragility as our dependent variable. The Probit and Relogit estimations also show a statistically significant negative effect of state history on extreme fragility. This is the case even after the inclusion of control variables.

Keywords: history, institutions, fragility.

JEL Classification: N00; O50; P50

*We thank Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea Guerzoni for sharing their data with us. Remaining errors are our own.
†Department of Economics, University of Kinshasa, DRC. Email: oasiskodila@yahoo.fr.
‡Department of Economics, California State University, Fullerton, CA, 92834, USA. Email: skhalifa@fullerton.edu.

1 Introduction

This paper examines the association between state history and state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa. State history refers to the duration of experience with statehood, the depth of exposure to state level institutions, and the protracted presence of state structures and systems. Some studies argue that societies with a long established state enjoy a head start. This early start confers upon their state institutions and state personnel advantages compared to newer states. Through a process of learning by doing, older states have a wider pool of experienced public personnel who can fulfill their duties in a more efficient manner. In addition, the continuous operation of state institutions promotes attitudes consistent with bureaucratic protocol and hierarchical discipline. This can enhance the organizational effectiveness and the executive efficiency of public administration which are critical for promoting economic, political, social, cultural and financial development.

This paper focuses on whether state history is one of the critical determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa. A fragile state is characterized by weak ineffective governments, diminished state capacity, inefficient public administration, poor public services, deficient state legitimacy, inadequate legal frameworks, growing absolute poverty, fractured national identities, lack of security, vulnerability to domestic and international conflicts, susceptibility to internal and external shocks, and proneness to crises. Fragile states have economic institutions that sustain the conditions of stagnation and inequality in wealth, income, and access to property ownership; social institutions that perpetuate the lack of access to public goods and services; and political institutions that entrench exclusionary power coalitions that promote extreme factionalism. These institutions create conditions that increase the likelihood of exposure to crises. There is ample documented evidence that several sub-Saharan African countries suffer from these symptoms.

There are few studies that attempted to discover the determinants of state fragility. For instance, Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) explore whether economic, demographic, geographic and institutional factors can predict the probability of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors find that institutions, in particular the civil liberties index and revolutions, are significant determinants of fragility. The authors conclude that the probability for a country to be fragile increases with constraints on civil liberties and the number of revolutions. Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2016) also assess the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using unexplored variables in the previous literature. The authors find that political interference, in the form of rent seeking and lobbying, increases the probability of state fragility by decreasing the effectiveness of governance.

Our paper contributes to this literature by arguing that one of the critical determinants of state fragility,

that the literature largely ignored, is state history. The intuition is that the longer the experience of a society with statehood, and the lengthier the exposure to state institutional structures, the less likely that the country will experience the symptoms of state fragility. The accumulation of knowledge overtime by state personnel allows state institutions to perform better, to be able to absorb any shocks, and to prepare for any potential crises. In addition, the efficiency of public administration allows the state to expand its capacity, to improve its effectiveness, to solidify its legitimacy, and to consolidate its authority. All these factors lead to a stronger, not a fragile, state.

To achieve its objective, the paper uses the state history index developed by Bockstette et al. (2002) as a proxy for the long experience with statehood. The Probit estimation shows that state history has a negative and statistically significant effect on the state fragility index. This result is robust even after the inclusion of a variety of control variables such as real GDP per capita, diamond deposits, conflict, education, fractionalization, colonial indicators, slave exports, civil liberties, and other indicators of institutional quality. The paper also uses extreme fragility as a dependent variable. The Probit and the Rare Events Logistic, Relogit, estimations confirm the statistically significant negative effect of state history on extreme fragility.

This paper comes at the intersection of two strands of literature. The first investigates the economic, political, social, cultural, and financial consequences of state history. The second attempts to uncover the determinants of state fragility. The contribution of our paper is twofold. It is the first attempt to examine the effect of state history on state fragility, within the literature that focuses on the consequences of the length of experience with statehood. This paper is also the first to consider state history as a factor in the literature that focuses on the determinants of state fragility.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature survey, section 3 includes the description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical estimation, and section 5 concludes. References and tables are included thereafter.

2 Literature

Some studies argue that the experience of the state, determined by its longevity or period in existence, can affect economic development. These studies argue that older states enjoy advantages that newer ones did not. For instance, Bockstette et al. (2002) develop an index of the depth of experience with state institutions, or state antiquity, for a large set of countries. The authors show that state antiquity has a positive significant effect on economic growth, output per worker, political stability and institutional quality.

Chanda and Putterman (2007) show that early states and old agrarian societies, like China and India, began to catch up with earlier industrializers while the new states experienced slow economic growth. To prove this, the authors provide evidence that state history has a positive effect on urbanization and population density in 1500, a significant negative effect on economic development in 1960 confirming a reversal of fortune during the era of European expansion, and a significant positive effect on income per capita in 1980 confirming that the reversal was being undone. Borcan et al. (2018) construct a data set on state history from the emergence of states before the Common Era to 2000. The authors develop a theoretical framework where accumulated state experience increases aggregate productivity, while newer inexperienced states can also achieve higher productivity by learning from older ones. The empirical analysis shows that state history has a hump-shaped relationship with technology adoption in 1500, population density in 1500, urbanization in 1500, technology adoption in 2000, and income per capita in 2000. The authors conclude that the hump shape indicates that newer states can enjoy a higher level of economic development compared to older ones.

Other studies explore the association between state history and financial development. The argument is that financial systems are the outcomes of a process shaped by the ability of the state to administer public finances, to regulate financial markets and financial institutions, and to legislate for financial transactions. Long standing states, with more experienced and trained civil servants, are more likely to be better equipped to formulate effective rules that contribute to financial development. These states are also expected to be more competent in the efficient use of funds, tax collection, and government administration which are critical for the emergence of the contemporary financial architecture.

In this context, Ang (2013) explore whether differences in financial development between countries can be explained by the depth of state experience. The analysis shows a significant positive effect of state antiquity on the ratio of private credit to GDP. The author finds that state antiquity is a significant determinant of financial development even after using different indicators for state history and financial development, controlling for potential endogeneity, and including other determinants of financial development. Ang and Fredriksson (2018) expand this analysis to examine the relationship between state history, legal origins and financial development. The authors find that, relative to common law, countries with adaptable German and Scandinavian civil law initially exhibit lower financial development. However, the longer the history of statehood in these countries the higher is their level of financial development. This is not found to be the case in countries with a rigid French civil law. Ang and Fredriksson (2017) argue that countries with longer state history at the time of colonization were better able to implement the legal practices transplanted

by their colonizers. The authors show that common law countries have weaker climate change policies and labor regulations compared to civil law countries, and the difference is inflated by a longer statehood experience.

Other studies examine the effect of state history on the extent of ethnic diversity. The argument is that national identity has been considered the linchpin in the process of state consolidation as it provides the common ground for interaction between citizens from different backgrounds. Thus, countries that have gone through a lengthy state-formation process are better able to forge a common identity which diminishes the degree of stratification. Bleaney and Dimico (2016) find that ethnic fractionalization is higher in less historically legitimate and, to a lesser extent, in states with a shorter history. The authors also show that ethnic polarization is much more weakly associated with these factors, which implies that large minorities are more resistant to absorption into the majority group than small ones.

Some studies investigate the effect of state history on the exposure to and timing of colonialism. Ertan et al. (2016) study the determinants of the occurrence and timing of colonization by European powers. The authors show that societies who were less likely to be colonized had longer histories of agriculture and statehood and higher levels of technology adoption in 1500.

Other studies explore the effect of the long exposure to statehood on the likelihood of conflict. The argument is that an accumulation of experience with state institutions may lead to improved state capacity and enhanced institutional capabilities over time. These factors allow these countries to be better equipped to maintain law and order, have stronger police presence, have efficient law enforcement, have the ability to negotiate compromises, are better able to allocate scarce resources, are better able to protect property, and have legal courts capable of peacefully settling disputes. Depetris-Chauvin (2016) show that the historical exposure to centralized institutions has a strong causal effect on the likelihood of conflict, and that countries with a long state history are less prone to experience conflict when hit by a negative agricultural productivity shock.

These studies conclude that state history is favorable to economic and financial development, but has an adverse effect on fractionalization and conflict. These findings allow us to expand the previous analyses to include the effect of state history on state fragility. This is because state fragility is more likely to be a symptom in countries that suffer from a high level of poverty, a high level of diversity, and a low level of institutional quality.

3 Data

The countries included in the analysis are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are included in table 1. The description of the variables and their data sources are included in table 2. The available data are organized as a panel that covers the 1992–2007 period and is composed of two cross-sections, over 1992–1999 and 2000–2007. The dependent variable is the fragility dummy in 1999 and 2007, that is, in the final year of each cross-section. For those variables for which we have yearly information, we consider their average value in 1992–1999 and 2000–2007.

3.1 State Fragility

We use the state fragility index as our dependent variable. This is a binary variable that assumes the value 1 for International Development Association (IDA) countries in the bottom two Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) quintiles or without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise. Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011, 2012) construct another indicator for extreme state fragility. This is a restriction of the fragility criterion from bottom two quintiles to the bottom quintile. In the case of extreme state fragility, the binary variable assumes the value of 1 for IDA countries in the bottom CPIA quintile or without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise. The detailed definition is included in Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011, 2012) and Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2016).

3.2 State History

We use the State Antiquity variable developed by Bockstette et al. (2002) who include a detailed description of the construction of the indicator.

3.3 Controls

Several control variables are used in the analysis to check the robustness of the results. These are economic, political, historical, cultural and institutional factors that are argued to be potential determinants of state

fragility by previous studies.

The first variable used is Real Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita which is derived from the Penn World Tables version 8.0. The logarithm of real Gross Domestic Product per capita is used in the analysis. The analysis also includes educational attainment which is proxied by "primary enrollment over official school age population" derived from the World Bank Education Statistics 5.3[1].

The ethnic fractionalization indicator is derived from Alesina et al. (2003)[2]. Fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from different ethnic groups. We also use the number of years under armed conflicts, derived from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset[3]. In addition, we include an indicator of natural endowments which is the number of diamond deposits derived from Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012).

We include some historical control variables in the analysis such as the colonial indicator which reflects the identity of the colonial power. The data distinguishes between British, French, Portuguese, and other European colonial powers. This data is derived from La Porta et al. (1999). We also use political status which is a categorical variable assuming value 2 for colonies, 1 for dependencies, and 0 for independent countries. This is derived from Bertocchi and Canova (2002). The paper also uses a variable for the total number of slaves exports, normalized for land area, during the period 1400-1900. This variable is derived from Nunn (2008).

Finally, we include some institutional quality indicators, such as the civil liberties index derived from Freedom House of 2008. We also use the government effectiveness index, the rule of law index, and the voice and accountability index derived from Worldwide Governance Indicators of 2009.

4 Estimation

This section empirically estimates the effect of state history on state fragility as follows

$$StateFragility_i = \alpha + StateHistory_i \ + X_i\gamma + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where $StateFragility_i$ is the state fragility index in country i. $StateHistory_i$ is the state antiquity index in country i, and X_i is a vector of economic, political, historical and institutional control variables. Since the dependent variable takes only two values, we use Probit estimation techniques.

[1] http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/
[2] The dataset can be found at: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html
[3] https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/

Table 3 includes the Probit results. The basic result is included in column 1 without any control variables. The results show that state history has a statistically significant negative effect on state fragility. The marginal effect imply that a unit change in state history decreases the probability of state fragility by more than 92%. We also add a variety of control variables, such as real GDP per capita, education, conflict, diamond deposits, and ethnic fractionalization in the subsequent columns. The results show that real GDP per capita has a statistically significant negative effect, but the coefficient loses its significance after adding the education variable. This indicates that even though fragility can be attributed to poverty, some relatively wealthier countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been plagued by corruption, rent seeking and predatory activities. These can create dysfunction that leads to state weakness. The primary enrollment variable is included because educational attainment is expected to be associated with a higher demand for checks and balances, democratization, and improved government quality. The education variable is, however, shown to be insignificant.

In table 3, the conflict variable shows a significant positive effect while diamond deposits and ethnic fractionalization do not seem to have a consistently significant coefficient. This indicates that previous involvement in armed conflicts makes a country more prone to current conflicts, which is symptomatic of state fragility. This seems to be more important than other factors that are known to induce conflict such as ethnic diversity or the natural resource curse. It is also worth noting that the marginal effects of state history increase as we add more control variables in table 3.

In table 4, we add the institutional variables to the list of indicators previously considered. The intuition is that even though fragility can be attributed to poverty, the symptoms of weakness only occur when dire economic conditions are combined with low quality state institutions that cannot contain the grievances and struggles caused by either an inequitable distribution of scarce resources or an unequal access to institutions. Table 4 shows that, in all specifications, state history has a statistically significant negative coefficient. The results also show that constraints to civil liberties has a significantly positive effect, but the coefficient loses its significance after we add other institutional variables. Government effectiveness show a negative coefficient that is highly significant even when we include other institutional indicators. The rule of law and voice and accountability also have significant negative coefficients, but their coefficients lose their significance once we add other institutional variables.

Table 5 add historical variables such as the colonial dummies and the number of slave exports. Historical factors, especially colonialism and the slave trades, are found to be particularly critical for contemporary economic and political outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. Several studies emphasize the consequences of

colonialism on the artificial character of state after independence, the dependence on the colonial power after decolonization, the haphazard nature of borders, the division of ethnic homelands, the establishment of persistent extractive institutions, the extraction of local resources, the metropole's partiality toward minorities, and other factors that contribute to state fragility. Slavery is also found to have a persistent effect on afflicted countries. Some studies found that slavery hindered the formation of larger communities and broader ethnic identities. Thus, the slave trades were a critical factor in sub-Saharan Africa's high level of ethnic stratification, conflict and weak states today. Table 5 shows that none of the coefficients of the historical variables have a significant effect on state fragility. However, the state history variable continues to exhibit a statistically significant negative effect in all specifications.

Table 6 and 7 use extreme fragility as the dependent variable. The Probit estimation in table 6 confirms the previous findings. The coefficient of state history shows a negative and statistically significant effect on extreme fragility in all specifications. In this context, extreme fragility is considered a rare event since the binary dependent variable have fewer ones than zeros. Thus, we apply the Rare Events Logistic Regression, Relogit, estimation techniques. This is because popular statistical procedures, such as Logistic regression, can underestimate the probability of rare events. Table 7 confirms the previous findings and show a significantly negative coefficient for state history in most specifications.

5 Conclusion

This paper examines the association between the length of experience with statehood, or state history, on the probability of state fragility. The argument is that the accumulation of knowledge by state personnel over time, and the build up of experience within state institutions, allows the state to avoid the exposure to recurrent crises, which is considered a symptom of weakness. The paper uses Probit estimation techniques and find that state history has a negative and statistically significant effect on the state fragility index. This result is robust after the inclusion of a variety of economic, political, institutional and historical variables. We also use extreme fragility as our dependent variable. The Probit and Relogit estimations confirm the previous findings of a statistically significant negative effect of state history. This is the case even after the inclusion of control variables as well.

References

[1] Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg. "Fractionalization." Journal of Economic Growth, 8: 155–94, 2003.

[2] Ang, James. "Are Modern Financial Systems Shaped by State Antiquity?" Journal of Banking and Finance, 37: 4038-4058, 2013.

[3] Ang, James and Per Fredriksson. "State History, Legal Adaptability and Financial Development." Journal of Banking and Finance, 89: 169-191, 2018.

[4] Ang, James and Per Fredriksson. "Statehood Experience, Legal Traditions, and Climate Change Policies." Economic Inquiry, 55(3): 1511-1537, 2017.

[5] Baliamoune-Lutz, Mina and Mark McGillivray. "State Fragility: Concept and Measurement." UNU-WIDER Research Paper No. 2008/44.

[6] Bertocchi, Graziella and Fabio Canova. "Did Colonization Matter for Growth?: An Empirical Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa's Underdevelopment." European Economic Review, 46(10): 1851-1871, 2002.

[7] Bertocchi, Graziella and Andrea Guerzoni. "The Fragile Definition of State Fragility." Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, 2: 339–356, 2011.

[8] Bertocchi, Graziella and Andrea Guerzoni. "Growth, History, or Institutions: What Explains State Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa?" Journal of Peace Research, 49(6): 769–83, 2012.

[9] Bleaney, Michael and Arcangelo Dimico. "State History, Historical Legitimacy and Modern Ethnic Diversity." European Journal of Political Economy, 43: 159-170, 2016.

[10] Bockstette, Valerie, Areendam Chanda, and Louis Putterman. "States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start." Journal of Economic Growth, 7: 347-369, 2002.

[11] Borcan, Oana, Ola Olsson, and Louis Putterman. "State History and Economic Development: Evidence from Six Millennia." Journal of Economic Growth, 23:1–40, 2018.

[12] Chanda, Areendam and Louis Putterman. "Early Starts, Reversals and Catch-up in the Process of Economic Development." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109(2), 387–413, 2007.

[13] Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio. "State History and Contemporary Conflict: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa." Documentos de Trabajo 475, Instituto de Economia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2016.

[14] Ertan, Arhan, Louis Putterman and Martin Fiszbein. "Who was Colonized and When? A Cross-Country Analysis of Determinants," European Economic Review, 83: 165-184, 2016.

[15] Kodila-Tedika, Oasis and Asongu Simplice. "State Fragility, Rent Seeking and Lobbying: Evidence from African Data." International Journal of Social Economics, 43(10): 1016 - 1030, 2016.

[16] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. "The Quality of Government." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1): 222-279, 1999.

[17] Nunn, Nathan. "The Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1): 139-176, 2008.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Fragility	90	0.4666667	0.5016826	0	1
State History	82	0.5197642	0.1553638	0.1666667	0.9218107
Real GDP per capita	94	7.334436	0.8997084	5.616685	9.690198
Conflict	96	1.791667	2.591146	0	8
Education	95	87.15206	31.13333	10.02623	193.8311
Diamond	96	0.3958333	0.491596	0	1
Fractionalization	94	0.6584255	0.2291998	0	0.9302
Slave Exports	94	3.592191	3.867984	-2.302585	8.818254
French Colony	96	0.3541667	0.4807706	0	1
Portugeuse Colony	96	0.1041667	0.3070802	0	1
British Colony	96	0.375	0.4866643	0	1
Other Colony	96	0.1666667	0.3746343	0	1
Civil LIberties	96	4.34561	1.344572	1.375	7
Political Status	84	1.785714	0.5165089	0	2
Government Effectiveness	96	2.784375	0.606536	1.41	4.23
Rule of Law	96	2.764687	0.685963	1.23	4.34
Voice and Accountability	96	2.873021	0.7402747	1.53	4.44

Table 1: Statistical Summaries

Variable	Description	Source
Fragility	Binary variable assuming value 1 for IDA countries in the bottom two CPIA quintiles or without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise	World Bank
Extreme fragility	Binary variable assuming value 1 for IDA countries in the bottom CPIA quintile or without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise	World Bank
Real GDP per capita	logarithm of Real GDP per capita	Penn World Tables
Diamonds	Number of diamond deposits	Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012)
Education	Primary enrollment over official school age population	World Bank Education Statistics 5.3
Fractionalization	Ethnic fractionalization index	Alesina et al. (2003)
Civil Liberties	Civil Liberties index	Freedom House (2008)
Conflicts	Number of years under armed conflicts	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
British colony	Value 1 for former British colonies, 0 otherwise	La Porta et al. (1999)
French colony	Value 1 for former French colonies 0 otherwise	La Porta et al. (1999)
Portuguese colony	Value 1 for former Portuguese colonies 0 otherwise	La Porta et al. (1999)
Political status	Value 2 for colonies, 1 for dependencies, and 0 for independent countries	Bertocchi & Canova (2002)
Government Effectiveness	Government effectiveness index	Worldwide Governance Indicators
Rule of Law	Rule of law index	Worldwide Governance Indicators
Voice and Accountability	Voice and Accountability index	Worldwide Governance Indicators
State History	State Antiquity index	Bockstette et al. (2002)
Slave Exports	Total number of slaves exported during the period 1400-1900, after normalization with land area	Nunn (2008)

Table 2: Data Description and Data Sources

	1	2	3	4	5	6
State History	-2.364**	-2.741**	-3.819***	-4.049***	-4.172***	-4.524***
	(1.012)	(1.079)	(1.229)	(1.296)	(1.295)	(1.455)
	[−0.9286]	[−1.070]	[−1.497]	[−1.582]	[−1.627]	[−1.732]
Real GDP per capita		-0.612***	-0.355*	-0.270	-0.330	-0.175
		(0.193)	(0.197)	(0.210)	(0.204)	(0.240)
Conflict			0.213***	0.208***	0.222***	0.269***
			(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.080)
Education				-0.004	-0.005	-0.009
				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Diamond					0.531	0.805**
					(0.339)	(0.369)
Fractionalization						0.988
						(0.951)
Constant	1.078*	5.648***	3.963**	3.823**	4.100**	2.581
	(0.558)	(1.572)	(1.673)	(1.686)	(1.628)	(2.217)
Observations	76	75	75	74	74	72
Pseudo R-squared	0.0553	0.1286	0.2247	0.2300	0.2536	0.3150

Table 2: Probit Estimations.

Robust standard errors in ()

Marginal Effects in []

0.01 significance ***; 0.05 significance **; 0.1 significance *

	7	8	9	10	11	18
State History	-4.285**	-4.520***	-5.067***	-3.676**	-6.591***	-10.812***
	(1.757)	(1.454)	(1.717)	(1.466)	(2.354)	(4.043)
	[−1.376]	[−1.730]	[−1.714]	[−1.320]	[−0.983]	[−1.208]
Civil Liberties	1.108***					1.126
	(0.311)					(1.477)
Political Status		0.082				-0.413
		(0.248)				(0.536)
Government Effectiveness			-4.407***			-10.121**
			(0.789)			(5.109)
Rule of Law				-2.225***		4.828
				(0.606)		(3.000)
Voice and Accountability					-4.091***	-1.783
					(0.885)	(2.693)
Constant	-3.665	2.451	4.839	5.298**	10.439**	-2.423
	(3.172)	(2.244)	(3.888)	(2.683)	(4.060)	(12.436)
Observations	72	72	72	72	72	72
Pseudo R-squared	0.5351	0.3155	0.7061	0.5411	0.7164	0.8146

Table 4: Probit Estimations.

Robust standard errors in ()

Marginal Effects in []

All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations

(i.e., Real GDP per capita, conflicts, Education, Diamonds, Fractionalization)

Results are not reported to conserve space.

0.01 significance ***; 0.05 significance **; 0.1 significance *

	12	13	14	15	16	17
State History	-4.782***	-4.845***	-4.830***	-4.989***	-5.120***	-5.217***
	(1.447)	(1.471)	(1.439)	(1.541)	(1.566)	(1.570)
	[−1.809]	[−1.837]	[−1.809]	[−1.897]	[−1.938]	[−1.970]
Slave Exports	0.108	0.089	0.133	0.091	0.125	0.123
	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.087)
French Colony		0.384				-0.357
		(0.454)				(0.706)
Portugeuse Colony			-0.950			-1.404
			(0.742)			(0.956)
British Colony				-0.355		-0.748
				(0.417)		(0.624)
Other Colony					0.682	
					(0.630)	
Constant	1.817	2.368	1.743	1.882	0.379	1.354
	(2.223)	(2.189)	(2.231)	(2.153)	(2.571)	(2.208)
Observations	72	72	72	72	72	72
Pseudo R-squared	0.3336	0.3422	0.3451	0.3415	0.3423	0.3597

Table 5: Probit Estimations.

Robust standard errors in ()

Marginal Effects in []

All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations

(i.e., Real GDP per capita, conflicts, Education, Diamonds, Fractionalization)

Results are not reported to conserve space.

0.01 significance ***; 0.05 significance **; 0.1 significance *

	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
State History	-4.485***	-5.334***	-5.703***	-4.652***	-53.324*	-4.686***	-17.653***
	(1.513)	(1.668)	(1.832)	(1.561)	(28.233)	(1.573)	(6.221)
	[−1.103]	[−1.261]	[−0.337]	[−1.104]	[]	[−0.312]	[$-5.19e-17$]
Slave Exports		0.022					
		(0.097)					
French Colony		-0.929					
		(0.977)					
Portugeuse Colony		-0.914					
		(1.015)					
British Colony		-1.156					
		(0.771)					
Civil LIberties			1.642***				
			(0.414)				
Political Status				-0.324			
				(0.333)			
Government Effectiveness					-82.359*		
					(44.835)		
Rule of Law						-3.551***	
						(0.821)	
Voice and Accountability							-15.987***
							(5.035)
Constant	1.331	-1.463	-4.842	1.175	37.598	8.369*	55.805***
	(3.438)	(4.993)	(4.434)	(3.560)	(26.490)	(4.453)	(19.877)
Observations	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
Pseudo R-squared	0.4015	0.4251	0.6398	0.4107	0.9038	0.6549	0.8336

Table 6: Probit Estimation (Extreme Fragility)

Robust standard errors in (), Marginal Effects in []

All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations

Results are not reported to conserve space.

0.01 significance ***; 0.05 significance **; 0.1 significance *

	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
State	-6.220**	-5.726*	-5.899**	-6.101**	-6.818**	-6.111++	-6.297**	293.577***	-4.416*	9.300
History	(2.819)	(2.972)	(2.931)	(3.038)	(2.708)	(3.071)	(2.916)	(37.099)	(2.533)	(10.703)
Slave		0.022	0.018	-0.026	0.025					
Exports		(0.154)	(0.197)	(0.161)	(0.177)					
French		0.205								
Colony		(1.111)								
Portugal			0.270							
Colony			(1.253)							
British				-0.624						
Colony				(0.876)						
Other					1.510					
Colony					(1.259)					
Civil						1.628***				
Liberties						(0.673)				
Political							-0.486			
Status							(0.556)			
Gov								478.121***		
Effective								(58.530)		
Rule									-3.076**	
of Law									(1.526)	
Voice										12.106
										(8.9618)
Constant	1.340	2.336	1.672	0.988	-5.480	1.628	0.4578	-228.197	6.050	-45.340
	(5.345)	(7.611)	(6.374)	(5.545)	(9.609)	(0.673)	(5.758)	(32.041)	(7.964)	(34.162)
Obs.	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66

Table 7: ReLogit Estimations (Extreme Fragility)

Robust standard errors in ()

All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations

Results are not reported to conserve space.

0.01 significance ***; 0.05 significance **; 0.1 significance *